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Note
Biotechnology Obviousness in the Post-Genomic Era:
KSR v. Teleflex and In re Kubin
Rebecca Hays*
In its landmark decision KSR International Co. v. Teleflex,
the Supreme Court announced new standards for obviousness
determination in patent examination.1 KSR is the Court’s first
substantive change to the obviousness standards originally set
forth in Graham v. John Deere Co. over four decades ago.2 In
KSR, the Court expanded the scope of the Graham analysis
and
criticized
the
long-standing
teaching-suggestionmotivation (TSM) test employed by the Federal Circuit to
implement the holding of Graham.3 The Court held that while
TSM is not inconsistent with Graham per se, it has been so
rigidly applied by the Federal Circuit as to “be inconsistent
with [the governing statute] and our precedents.”4 Under KSR,
a proper TSM inquiry is not limited to prior art in an inventor’s
particular field of endeavor or even analogous fields, and may
consider whether the invention in question was “obvious to try”
to a person of ordinary skill in the art,5 a standard that had

© 2009 Rebecca Hays.
* J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School. Ph.D. Genetics &
Molecular Biology, Northwestern University 1999. B.S. Biology, University
of Minnesota 1993. Dr. Hays held a National Institutes of Health
Postdoctoral Fellowship at Washington University School of Medicine
2000-2003, and served on the faculty of the University of Kansas,
Department of Molecular Biosciences 2003-2007. She has researched,
lectured, and published in the areas of genetics and developmental
biology.
1. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
2. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
3. TSM was first articulated by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA) in Application of Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956–57 (C.C.P.A.
1961). The CCPA (1910-1982), is the predecessor to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (CAFC, Fed. Cir.)(1983-present).
4. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 428.
5. Id. at 420.
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been explicitly rejected by the Federal Circuit.6
In Ex parte Kubin,7 the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (Board) made its first attempt to implement the
holding of KSR in the context of a biotechnology patent. In that
case, the Board affirmed the rejection of claims to nucleic acid
sequences encoding the human NAIL protein.8 The claims were
held obvious because the methods employed to isolate the
sequences were known in the prior art and because the protein
was known to exist in some form.9 Notably, however, the
actual sequences claimed in Kubin were not disclosed by the
prior art.10
The Board held the Kubin rejections permissible under the
new standards of KSR, in direct opposition to a Federal Circuit
case that has set the standard for biotechnology obviousness
for over a decade, In re Deuel.11 The Board cited language in
KSR critical of the holding of Deuel, which it interpreted as
overruling the decision.12
In a much-anticipated decision, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the Board’s rejection of the Kubin claims
unreservedly.13 The court held in In re Kubin that because the
methods employed by the claimants were well-known in the
art, they enjoyed a reasonable expectation of success that
rendered the end product obvious and unpatentable.14 This
holding unequivocally overturns some aspects of Deuel and
dramatically alters the patentability landscape of modern
biotechnology.
This Note addresses the current state of obviousness
determination in modern biotechnology and the potential
impact of KSR on the biotechnology industry as seen in In re

6. See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
7. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410 (B.P.A.I. 2007).
8. Natural killer cell activation-inducing ligand. See Marek Z. Kubin
et al., Molecular Cloning and Biological Characterization of NK Cell
Activation-Inducing Ligand, a Counterstructure for CD48, 29 EUR. J.
IMMUNOLOGY 3466 (1999).
9. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
10. Id. at 1412–13.
11. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
12. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
13. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr.
3, 2009).
14. Id. at *9–10.
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Kubin. Section I discusses the evolution of obviousness
doctrine, key Federal Circuit precedents relating to innovations
in biotechnology, and the holdings of KSR, Ex parte Kubin, and
In re Kubin. Section II discusses functional considerations in
biotechnology obviousness and the relevance of KSR to the
industry as a whole. It addresses the sophisticated level of
ordinary skill in the so-called Post-Genomic Era,15 and
describes ways in which generic obviousness standards, such
as those articulated in KSR, are fundamentally incompatible
with realities of biology. The Note concludes by advocating for
industry-tolerant obviousness standards that promote the
public interest in biotechnology research while setting
reasonable standards for patentability.

I. OBVIOUSNESS THEN AND NOW
A. EVOLUTION OF MODERN OBVIOUSNESS STANDARDS:
HOTCHKISS, GRAHAM, KSR
The statutory requirement for nonobviousness of a novel
invention is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 103, which bars the grant
of a patent where the differences between the invention and
the prior art are such that “the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.”16 Enacted in 1952,17 § 103 is a
codification of the judicial doctrine of nonobviousness first
articulated by the Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.18
In that case, the Court held that irrespective of the
requirements for novelty and utility,19 the standard for
15. Life science researchers coined the term post-genomic in the late1990s in reference to the advanced state of modern genetics. Initially, the
term referred specifically to the completion of genome sequencing for
several genetic model organisms. In the last several years the term has
taken on a broader meaning, referring generally to the high level of
sophistication of modern life science research and the vast resources
available to researchers. See generally Sydney Brenner, Genomics: The
End of the Beginning, 287 SCIENCE 2173 (2000); Gerald M. Rubin et al.,
Comparative Genomics of the Eukaryotes, 287 SCIENCE 2204 (2000).
16. United States Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
17. Id.
18. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 265–67 (1850).
19. Utility and novelty standards are set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–
102. Section 101 provides for the grant of a patent to “[w]hoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
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patentability of an invention is ingenuity and not ordinary
skill.20
The general holding of Hotchkiss supports sound public
policy considerations. Enforcing a minimal standard for
nonobviousness prevents inventors from obtaining rights to
products already in the public domain by adding trivial
modifications.21 It also ensures that the exclusive rights
conferred to the patent holder are proportional to the public
benefit gained by the inventor’s contribution to the public store
of knowledge—a classic quid pro quo.22 The ingenuity of
invention standard of Hotchkiss proved an inadequate
measure, however, as it was too ambiguous and difficult to
apply uniformly. As the Court later reflected, “[t]he truth is the
word [invention] cannot be defined in such manner as to afford
any substantial aid in determining whether a particular device
involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not.”23 The
Court recognized that the Hotchkiss standard was sufficiently
vague to spur “a large variety of opinions as to its meaning
both in the Patent Office, in the courts, and at the bar.”24
Indeed, the Court itself struggled to devise a reasonable
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof . . . .”
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Section 102 sets forth extensive guidelines for
determination of the novelty of an invention relative to the prior art. § 102.
20. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267.
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old
method . . . were required . . . than were possessed by an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of
that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential
elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is
the work of the skilful mechanic, not that of the inventor.
Id. (holding invalid a patent substituting the use of porcelain or clay for
wood or metal in the manufacture of doorknobs).
21. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6
(1966) (“Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents
whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or
to restrict free access to materials already available.”); see also Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)
(quoting the above passage from Graham).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178,
186–87 (1933), amended by 289 U.S. 706 (1933) (“[The inventor] may
keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In consideration
of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent
is granted.”).
23. Graham, 383 U.S. at 11 (alteration in original) (quoting McClain v.
Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891)).
24. Id. at 12.
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standard for obviousness after Hotchkiss, at one time adopting
the controversial and highly subjective test that inventions not
created in a “flash of genius” do not meet the requirements for
patentability.25
Following Congressional enactment of § 103 mandating an
objective standard for nonobviousness,26 the Court fashioned
the modern test of Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,
issued more than a century after Hotchkiss.27 Under Graham,
obviousness would be determined through characterization of
1) the scope and content of the prior art, 2) the differences
between the prior art and the claims, and 3) the ordinary level
of skill in the pertinent art.28 The Court also identified
secondary considerations that may suggest nonobviousness,
including commercial success, long-felt, unresolved needs, and
the failure of others in the same endeavor.29 These
considerations would be particularly helpful, the Court felt, in
avoiding the pitfalls of hindsight bias—“the temptation to read
into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue”30—
which had arisen in other post-Hotchkiss cases.31
The Court recognized that irrespective of its formal
pronouncements in Graham, uniform application of the
nonobviousness test would require further development of the
doctrine in the lower courts.32 In fact, the Court of Customs
25. Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91
(1941), amended by 314 U.S. 587 (1942) (“That is to say the new device,
however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius not
merely the skill of the calling. If it fails, it has not established its right to a
private grant on the public domain.”). The “flash of genius” standard was
overturned by § 103, which states that “[p]atentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) (2006).
26. See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 225–26 (1976) (“[I]t was only
in 1952 that Congress, in the interest of ‘uniformity and definiteness,’
articulated the requirement in a statute . . . .”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979,
at 6 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 1923, at 7 (1952)).
27. Graham, 383 U.S. at 3 (invalidating a patent covering a “Clamp for
vibrating Shank Plows” as an obvious modification of prior art elements).
28. Id. at 17–18.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 36.
31. See, e.g., Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Rubber Tire Co., 220
U.S. 428, 435 (1911) (“Knowledge after the event is always easy, and
problems once solved present no difficulties, indeed, may be represented
as never having had any . . . .”).
32. Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
This is not to say, however, that there will not be difficulties in
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and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) had already devised a method to
implement the holding of Hotchkiss. The teaching-suggestionmotivation (TSM) standard, first articulated five years before
Graham,33
became
the
cornerstone
of
obviousness
determination in the lower courts. Under the TSM test, an
invention is obvious where there is a teaching, suggestion, or
motivation in the analogous prior art to make the product in
question.34 References are selected for their relevance to the
subject matter based on the judgment of a person of ordinary
skill in the art, but are not limited to explicit statements.35
Motivation may be implicit in the prior art as a whole, or
suggested by the nature of the problem addressed by the
invention.36 In the Federal Circuit’s view, this test “picks up
where the analogous art test leaves off and informs the
Graham analysis,”37 lending both direction and scope to the
inquiry.38
Use of the Federal Circuit’s TSM test in the lower courts
went largely unchallenged for over four decades. In KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Court made its first
substantive changes to Graham, broadening the scope of the
relevant prior art and rejecting the Federal Circuit’s TSM
application as impermissibly narrow.39
The dispute in KSR involved rights to an adjustable
automobile pedal featuring electronic sensing devices.40 The
individual elements of the invention were present in the prior
applying the nonobviousness test. What is obvious is not a
question upon which there is likely to be uniformity of thought in
every given factual context. The difficulties, however, are
comparable to those encountered daily by the courts . . . and
should be amenable to a case-by-case development.
Id.
33. Application of Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956–57 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
34. See, In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986–87 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Although
our predecessor court was the first to articulate the motivationsuggestion-teaching test, a related test—the the analogous art test—has
long been part of the primary Graham analysis articulated by the
Supreme Court.”) (citing Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 227–29 (1976)).
35. Id. at 987.
36. Id. at 987–88.
37. Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., 464 F.3d 1286, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(quoting Kahn, 441 F. 3d at 987).
38. See id. at 1290–91.
39. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418–19 (2007).
40. Id. at 407–08.
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art, but the combination of elements had not been previously
disclosed.41 The Federal Circuit reversed the finding of patent
invalidity for failure of the lower court to properly apply the
TSM test.42 The court recognized that the elements of the
invention were known in the industry, but held that the
district court failed to identify a motivation in the prior art that
would lead a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the
elements.43
In reversing the Federal Circuit’s holding, the Supreme
Court criticized its application of the TSM test as a “rigid rule
that limits the obviousness inquiry.”44 The Court did not
consider the test fundamentally at odds with Graham, only the
manner in which the Federal Circuit had applied it in this and
other cases.45 Specifically, the Court held it is error to limit the
Graham inquiry to the particular problem the inventor is trying
to solve or prior art addressing the same issue, stating that,
“[u]nder the correct analysis, any need or problem known in
the field . . . can provide a reason for combining the elements
in the manner claimed.”46 Moreover, courts should not assume
that inventors will be guided only by prior art elements
directed to the particular problem they are working on, but
should regard the person of ordinary skill in the art as having
the “ordinary creativity” to assemble even unrelated prior art
“like pieces of a puzzle.”47 The Court minimized the Federal
41. See id. at 408–09.
42. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l. Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 286 (Fed. Cir.
2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
43. Id. at 288.
[The district court invalidated the patent] without making
“finding[s] as to the specific understanding or principle within the
knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have motivated one with
no knowledge of [the] invention to make the combination in the
manner claimed.” Under our case law, whether based on the
nature of the problem to be solved, the express teachings of the
prior art, or the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, the
district court was required to make specific findings as to whether
there was a suggestion or motivation to combine . . . .
Id. (second and third alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting In
re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
44. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 419.
45. Id. (“There is no necessary inconsistency between the idea
underlying the TSM test and the Graham analysis. But when a court
transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that limits the
obviousness inquiry . . . it errs.”).
46. Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 420–21.
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Circuit’s concern that poorly-defined obviousness criteria may
give way to hindsight bias,48 and called for a “common sense”
approach
to
obviousness
determination,
including
consideration of what may be obvious to try in a given field of
endeavor.49 As the Court explained:
The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to
conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious
merely by showing that the combination of elements was “obvious
to try.” When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a
problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue
the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads
to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of
innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that
instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might
show that it was obvious under § 103.50

Ultimately, the Court called for the Federal Circuit to apply
a “flexible” TSM test that considers common knowledge and
common sense to assess obviousness in light of prior art.51
48. Id. at 421.
The Court of Appeals, finally, drew the wrong conclusion from the
risk of courts and patent examiners falling prey to hindsight bias.
A factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused
by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant
upon ex post reasoning. Rigid preventative rules that deny
factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither
necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
49. The Court called for the use of a common sense approach to
obviousness determination no fewer than four times throughout the
opinion: “Although common sense directs one to look with care at a patent
application that claims . . . the combination of two known devices . . . it
can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person
of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way
the claimed new invention does.” Id. at 418; “[c]ommon sense teaches,
however, that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary
purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit
the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle . . . . If
this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of
innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.” Id. at 420; “[r]igid
preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense,
however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.”
Id. at 421.
50. Id. at 421 (internal citation omitted).
51. Id. at 421–22. The Court noted that the Federal Circuit had begun
to implement a more flexible test prior to the writing of KSR. Id. (citing
DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464
F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464
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The Federal Circuit acknowledged the edict of KSR in
Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., where it
defended the TSM test, holding that “the teaching, suggestion,
motivation test remains good law for obviousness, only a rigid
application of that test is problematic.”52 The court announced
a reformulation of the test in Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceuticals v.
Mylan Laboratories:
The TSM test, flexibly applied, merely assures that the
obviousness test proceeds on the basis of evidence—teachings,
suggestions (a tellingly broad term), or motivations (an equally
broad term)—that arise before the time of invention as the statute
requires. As KSR requires, those teachings, suggestions, or
motivations need not always be written references but may be
found within the knowledge and creativity of ordinarily skilled
artisans.53

Notwithstanding this change, the court reiterated its view
on the pitfalls of hindsight bias, which had been trivialized in
KSR,54 stating that “a flexible TSM test remains the primary
guarantor against a non-statutory hindsight analysis.”55 The
court was also quick to re-tool the KSR standard for
predictability in obviousness determination. Recall that KSR
calls for a finding of obviousness where there is a “finite
number of identified, predictable solutions.”56 The Federal
Circuit version limits the KSR standard to an “easily traversed,
small and finite number of alternatives,”57 a standard
specifically tailored to accommodate the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical industries, which the Federal Circuit has long
held to be unpredictable arts.58
The impact of KSR on biotechnology patents depends
largely on whether it is interpreted as overruling In re Deuel, a
key Federal Circuit decision that centered on the interF.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
52. Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 260 F. App’x
284, 290 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
53. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358,
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
54. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
55. Ortho-McNeil, 520 F.3d at 1364.
56. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 421.
57. Ortho-McNeil, 520 F.3d at 1364.
58. See, e.g., Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“To the extent an art is unpredictable, as the chemical
arts often are, KSR’s focus on these ‘identified, predictable solutions’ may
present a difficult hurdle because potential solutions are less likely to be
genuinely predictable.”).
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relatedness of DNA, RNA, and proteins.59 Before discussing the
holdings of those cases, a short biology refresher is in order.

B. A GENETICS PRIMER
The term genome refers to an organism’s full complement
of genetic material.60 It is composed of deoxyribonucleic acid

Fig. 1 Schematic diagram of transcription and
translation. Double-stranded DNA is transcribed into an
mRNA intermediate, which is translated into a polypeptide
sequence. Three base-pair codons are separated in this
illustration for clarity. Note that the amino acid leucine
(Leu) is encoded by two different codons on the level of
DNA (GAC and AAC) and mRNA (CUG and UUG). This is
59. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
known as degeneracy of the genetic code. See also, Fig. 2
60. See generally ANTHONY GRIFFITHS ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC
accompanying
discussion.
ANALYSISand
295–349
(9th ed.
2008) (providing an undergraduate-level

explanation of DNA structure and gene expression); John M. Conley &
Roberte Makowski, Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier
to Biotechnology Patents in the United States—And Perhaps Europe as
Well, 13 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 3, 8–11 (2004) (presenting an advancedlevel review in the context of a discussion on patentable subject matter);
see also, In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 895–99 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(discussing basic recombinant DNA technology).
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(DNA), and is the storehouse of biological information
necessary for all aspects of an organism’s existence, including
embryonic
development,
growth,
maturation,
and
reproduction. DNA is a linear molecule made up of repeating
sub-units called bases: adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G),
thymine (T). It commonly exists in the form of a doublestranded molecule—a double helix—in which two linear DNA
molecules twist around each other in a right-handed spiral.
The positioning of DNA strands relative to each other is
controlled by complementary base pairing, which is the result
of interactions between bases on opposing strands. The
chemical nature of the bases is such that adenine on one
strand always pairs with thymine on the other (A-T), and
cytosine on one strand always pairs with guanine on the other
(C-G). Thus, any given position on a molecule of doublestranded DNA is referred to as a base-pair (Fig. 1).
The term gene refers to a discrete unit of DNA, and is on
the order of 103 base pairs in length.61 Many genes encode the
proteins that comprise cells and tissues. That is, they carry all
of the information—in code—necessary to make the protein
product. Proteins are generated through a two-step process
called transcription and translation (Fig. 1). In transcription,
DNA serves as a template for the synthesis of ribonucleic acid
(RNA), a related but distinct molecule. This particular type of
RNA (there are many) is referred to as messenger RNA (mRNA).
mRNA is a single stranded molecule also composed of
repeating bases, in which thymine is replaced with the related
base uracil (U). The order of bases in mRNA is specified by the
order of bases on the DNA template strand. Thus, through
mRNA synthesis, the code of DNA is transcribed into an
intermediate molecule. mRNA derives its name from its role in
protein synthesis. It literally carries the DNA message from the
site of transcription to the site of protein assembly.
In translation, mRNA serves as a template for the
assembly of amino acids into a polypeptide or protein.
Individual amino acids are specified by nucleic acid sequences
three base-pairs in length, called codons, present in both the
61. The human genome contains approximately three billion basepairs of DNA encoding an estimated 20,000-25,000 genes. Human
Genome Program, U.S. Dep’t of Energy Office of Sci., The Science Behind
the
Human
Genome
Project
(Mar.
26,
2008),
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/info.sh
tml.
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Fig. 2 Implications of degeneracy of the genetic code on
the predictability of gene sequences. For simplicity, the
mRNA intermediate is not shown. A. Reading forward, from
DNA to protein, is straightforward. The sequence of amino
acids in the protein product is predicable from the DNA
sequence alone. B. The converse is not true. Because most
amino acids are specified by more than one codon, it is not
possible to predict the gene sequence from knowledge of the
amino acid sequence alone.
DNA and mRNA. Together, the processes of transcription and
translation are referred to as gene expression. Genes are said
to be expressed when the DNA is transcribed and the gene
product is made. Generally speaking, the cells of a given
organism all carry the same complement of DNA—the same
genes. However, not all cells express all genes. During
development and throughout life, cells assume different fates,
with different properties and functions, through differential
gene expression. For example, liver cells express liver-specific
genes, while muscle cells express muscle-specific genes.
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One final point about protein translation relates to the
specificity of genetic coding for amino acids. As described
above, individual amino acids are specified by nucleic acid
sequences three base-pairs in length—codons. However,
permutation of the four DNA bases generates more codons (43
= 64 possible three-base-pair sequences) than there are amino
acids (20). For this reason, most amino acids are specified by
more than one codon. Some are specified by as many as six
codons. This is referred to as degeneracy of the genetic code,
and it is the punch line of this biology primer.
Forward reading of the genetic code—DNA to protein—is
straightforward. The mRNA and protein sequences are fully
predictable from the DNA sequence alone (Fig. 2A). The
converse, however, is categorically untrue. Due to degeneracy
of the code, the amino acid sequence of a protein does not give
a read of the parent gene sequence. Consider the number of
possible codon combinations for the simple peptide shown in
Fig. 2B, in which three of the five amino acids are specified by
six different codons.62 Most proteins are much larger than this
example, with a staggering number of potential coding
sequences.63

C. FEDERAL CIRCUIT PRECEDENTS: IN RE BELL AND IN RE DEUEL
Two Federal Circuit decisions in the mid-1990s, In re
Bell64 and In re Deuel,65 set the standard for obviousness in
genetics innovation. In Bell, the claims were directed to nucleic
acid sequences (both DNA and RNA) encoding human insulinlike growth factors (IGF) I and II.66 The Board held the claims
62. Care to try your hand? There are 1728 possible coding sequences
for this short peptide.
63. See, for example, In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1993), in
which the claimant calculated 1036 potential coding sequences for insulinlike growth factor, a 79 amino acid protein.
64. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 781.
65. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
66. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 782 n.3. Claim 25 is representative:
A composition comprising nucleic acid molecules containing a
human sequence encoding insulin-like growth factor (hIGF)
substantially free of nucleic acid molecules not containing said
hIGF sequence, wherein said hIGF sequence is selected from the
group consisting of: (a) 5 ‘-GGA CCG . . . wherein U can also be T;
(b) 5 ‘-GCU UAC . . . wherein U can also be T; (c) nucleic acid
sequences complementary to (a) or (b); and (d) fragments of (a), (b)
or (c) that are at least 18 bases in length and which will
selectively hybridize to human genomic DNA encoding hIGF.
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prima facie obvious over the combined teachings of a U.S.
patent to Weissman67 and two scientific publications disclosing
the amino acid sequences of the growth factors.68 The
Weissman patent taught the use of nucleic acid probes to
isolate genes of interest, wherein the sequence of the probe
encodes the relevant protein and is therefore complementary to
the relevant mRNA.69 The disclosure specified that the probes
should be designed using unique codons to circumvent
degeneracy of the genetic code, and described use of the
method to isolate a gene unrelated to IGF.70 The Board
reasoned that because of the natural relatedness of proteins
and their corresponding genes, knowledge of a protein’s amino
acid sequence renders the gene sequence obvious.71 The Board
also held that the Weissman patent illustrated that the
ordinary artisan would know how to use a protein sequence to
isolate the corresponding gene.72
In reversing the Board’s rejection of the Bell claims, the
Federal Circuit emphasized that because of degeneracy of the
code, knowledge of a protein sequence does not render a gene
sequence obvious, stating:
It may be true that, knowing the structure of the protein, one can
use the genetic code to hypothesize possible structures for the
corresponding gene and that one thus has the potential for
obtaining that gene. However, because of the degeneracy of the
genetic code, there are a vast number of nucleotide sequences
that might code for a specific protein. In the case of IGF, Bell has
argued without contradiction that the [prior art] amino acid
sequences could be coded for by more than 1036 different
nucleotide sequences, only a few of which are the human
sequences that Bell now claims. Therefore, given the nearly
infinite number of possibilities suggested by the prior art, and the
failure of the cited prior art to suggest which of those possibilities
is the human sequence, the claimed sequences would not have
Id. at 782 n.3.
67. Method for Cloning Genes, U.S. Patent No. 4,394,443 (filed Dec.
18, 1980) (issued July 19, 1983).
68. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 783; Ernst Rinderknecht and René E.
Humbel, The Amino Acid Sequence of Human Insulin-Like Growth Factor I
and Its Structural Homology with Proinsulin, 253 J. BIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY
2769 (1978); Ernst Rinderknecht and René E. Humbel, Primary Structure
of Human Insulin-Like Growth Factor II, 89 FEBS LETTERS 283 (1978).
69. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 783.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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been obvious.73

The court explicitly reserved judgment on whether the
converse is also true. That is, whether knowledge of a gene
sequence renders the corresponding amino acid sequence
obvious.74 The court also rejected the notion that use of a
generally known method to isolate gene sequences renders the
sequences themselves obvious.75
In Deuel, the claims were directed to genomic DNA and
cDNA76 sequences coding for heparin-binding growth factors
isolated from human and bovine placental tissue.77 The Board
held the claims obvious over the combined teachings of a
European patent application by Bohlen78 and a molecular
biology laboratory manual by Maniatis.79 The Bohlen reference
73. Id. at 784.
74. Id. at 784 n.6 (“We also express no opinion concerning the reverse
proposition, that knowledge of the structure of a DNA, e.g., a cDNA, might
make a coded protein obvious.”).
75. Id. at 785 (“[T]he issue is the obviousness of the claimed
compositions, not of the method by with they are made.”) (citing In re
Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added)).
76. A cDNA, or complementary DNA, is not a naturally occurring
molecule. It is an engineered DNA prepared by reverse-transcribing mRNA
isolated from cells or tissue. cDNAs encode for the same products as their
corresponding genomic sequences and are used to achieve gene
expression outside of its normal context (e.g., in bacteria). See generally J.
SAMBROOK ET AL., MOLECULAR CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL (3d. ed.
2001) (a comprehensive guide to nucleic acid cloning and expression of
cloned genes in vitro).
77. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Claims 4-7 were
appealed:
4. A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting of a sequence
encoding human heparin binding growth factor of 168 amino
acids having the following amino acid sequence: Met Gln
Ala . . . [remainder of 168 amino acid sequence].
5. The purified and isolated cDNA of human heparin-binding
growth factor having the following nucleotide sequence:
GTCAAAGGCA . . . [remainder of 961 nucleotide sequence].
6. A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting of a sequence
encoding bovine heparin binding growth factor of 168 amino acids
having the following amino acid sequence: Met Gln
Thr . . . [remainder of 168 amino acid sequence].
7. The purified and isolated cDNA of bovine heparin-binding
growth factor having the following nucleotide sequence:
GAGTGGAGAG . . . [remainder of 1196 nucleotide sequence].
Id.at 1555 (alterations in original).
78. European Patent No. 89,101,187 (filed Jan. 24, 1989).
79. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1557; T. MANIATIS ET AL., MOLECULAR
CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL 353–61 (1982) (describing a protocol for
screening bacteriophage libraries in Escherichia coli).
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disclosed three protein growth factors known only as heparinbinding mitogens, and reported a partial amino acid sequence
for each.80 Bohlen taught explicitly that the proteins were
brain-specific, and did not teach any details of the
corresponding genomic DNA or cDNAs.81 The Maniatis
reference taught general methods for the isolation of gene
sequences, including the method used by the inventor.82 The
Board held that a person of ordinary skill in the art could have
designed nucleic acid probes based on the amino acid
sequences disclosed in Bohlen, and then used the general
methods of Maniatis to isolate the genes in question.83 The
Board considered it irrelevant that the Bohlen reference taught
away84 from the Deuel claims by reporting that the proteins
were brain-specific, and that the DNA sequences claimed
encoded the full-length proteins, not just the portions
disclosed by Bohlen.85
The Federal Circuit reversed the finding of obviousness,
citing its holdings in Bell.86 The court held that while general
aspects of the proteins may have been obvious in light of the
Bohlen reference (e.g. the general class and function of the
proteins), the precise DNA sequences claimed were not obvious
and could not have been predicted based on the amino acid
sequence due to redundancy of the genetic code.87 The court
80. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1555–56. Bohlen reported the N-terminal
nineteen amino acids of each protein. Id. at 1556.
81. Id. at 1556.
82. Id. at 1555–56. The claimant screened human and bovine cDNA
libraries using degenerate DNA probes encoding the N-terminal twentyfive amino acids of the proteins, which he had determined himself from
the isolated proteins. Id. at 1555.
83. Id. at 1557.
84. A reference is said to teach away from an invention when it would
discourage a person of skill in the art from pursuing a technology or a
particular approach to innovation. In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
85. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1556–57.
86. Id. at 1559.
87. Id. at 1558.
[O]ne could not have conceived the [claimed sequences] based on
the teachings in the cited prior art because, until the claimed
molecules were actually isolated and purified, it would have been
highly unlikely for one of ordinary skill in the art to contemplate
what was ultimately obtained. What cannot be contemplated or
conceived cannot be obvious.
Id.
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also reiterated its view that the existence of general methods
for gene isolation do not render obvious claimed sequences,
even where knowledge of the methods is coupled with
knowledge of the protein sequence.88 In the words of the court,
“‘obvious to try’ has long been held not to constitute
obviousness.”89

D. EX PARTE KUBIN AND IN RE KUBIN
The pre-KSR standard for biotechnology obviousness was
grounded in functional aspects of the biology involved. The
Federal Circuit appreciated the implications of genetic
redundancy, and inventor reliance on proven biochemical
methods was not fatal to a claim of non-obviousness.90 If In re
Kubin is any indication, however, KSR may have changed all
that.91
The claims in Kubin were directed to nucleic acid
sequences encoding the human NAIL,92 a protein involved in
the regulation of immune responses.93 In Ex parte Kubin, the
Board held the claims obvious94 over the combined teachings
of a U.S. patent to Valiante,95 a molecular biology laboratory
manual by Sambrook,96 and a scientific publication by Mathew
88. Id. at 1559 (“Thus, even if, as the examiner stated, the existence of
general cloning techniques, coupled with knowledge of a protein’s
structure, might have provided motivation to prepare a cDNA or made it
obvious to prepare a cDNA, that does not necessarily make obvious a
particular claimed cDNA.”).
89. Id. (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
90. See generally In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1552; In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781
(Fed. Cir 1993).
91. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646, at *7–10 (Fed. Cir.
Apr. 3, 2009).
92. Claim 73 is representative: “An isolated nucleic acid molecule
comprising a polynucleotide encoding a polypeptide at least 80% identical
to amino acids 22-221 of SEQ ID NO:2, wherein the polypeptide binds
CD48.” Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1412 (BPAI 2007).
93. See Kubin et al., supra note 8.
94. The claimants also appealed the rejection of claims under § 112,
¶ 1 , 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), for deficiencies in enablement and written
description. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S. P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415. The Board
reversed the examiner’s rejection for lack of enablement and affirmed
rejection for insufficient written description. Id. at 1417.
95. Human Cytotoxic Lymphocyte Signal Transduction Surface
Protein (P38) and Monoclonal Antibodies Thereto, U.S. Patent No.
5,688,690 (filed Sept. 16, 1994) (issued Nov. 18, 1997).
96. J. SAMBROOK ET AL., MOLECULAR CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL
2.43–2.84 (2d. ed. 1989). This is the second edition of the Maniatis
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that described isolation of the murine (mouse) homologue of
NAIL.97
The Valiante patent disclosed the existence of a protein
present on the surface of natural killer cells98 known only as
p38, and claimed a monoclonal antibody specific for the
protein.99 Valiante did not report the amino acid sequence of
p38 or the DNA sequences encoding the protein.100 However,
Valiante described a prophetic method to isolate p38 coding
sequences using the antibody he had claimed.101 The
claimants in Kubin used the Valiante method, as well as the
Valiante antibody,102 to isolate the p38 coding sequences,
which they then gave the more descriptive name NAIL.103
In denying the claims, the Board invoked arguments
parallel to those rejected by the Federal Circuit in Deuel. It
held that the combined teachings of the prior art references
rendered it obvious to attempt to clone the NAIL sequences
even if the claimed product was not itself previously disclosed,
and that the claimants had a reasonable expectation of
success.104 In other words, the general availability of the
method employed rendered the product obvious. The Board
argued that there were a limited number of methodologies
available to isolate the NAIL cDNA and that
[t]he skilled artisan would have had reason to try these
methodologies with the reasonable expectation that at least one
would be successful. Thus, isolating NAIL cDNA was “the product
not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense,”

manual. See supra, note 79.
97. Porunelloor Mathew et al., Cloning and Characterization of the 2B4
Gene Encoding a Molecule Associated with Non- MHC-Restricted Killing
Mediated by Activated Natural Killer Cells and T Cells, 151 J. IMMUNOLOGY
5328 (1993). Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412, 1415.
98. A natural killer cell is a type of lymphocyte (white blood cell) that
mediates immune responses. See generally Kubin et al., supra note 8.
99. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412.
100. Id. at 1412–13.
101. Id. at 1412 (“Valiante expressly teaches through a prophetic
example how to ‘isolat[e] the cDNA clone by using [mAb] C1.7, screening
the protein expression in the cell transfected with the cDNA library and
cloning a corresponding cDNA into a plasmid for sequencing.’”)
(alterations in original).
102. mAb C1.7 was made commercially available by Valiante following
issue of the patent. Id. at 1413.
103. Id. at 1411–12.
104. Id. at 1414–15.
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leading us to conclude NAIL cDNA is not patentable as it would
have been obvious to isolate it.105

The Board considered it irrelevant that the Mathew
reference taught away from the Kubin subject matter by
reporting that there is no human homologue of NAIL.106
Rather, it felt that the Mathew reference merely represented
conflicting data in the field and would not deter a skilled
artisan from pursuing the teachings of Valiante.107 In the
words of the Board, “one of ordinary skill in the art would have
recognized the value of isolating NAIL cDNA, and would have
been motivated to apply conventional methodologies, such as
those disclosed in Sambrook and utilized in Valiante, to do
so.”108
The Board invoked the language of KSR to support its
ruling, principally, the Supreme Court’s statement that
“obvious to try” is permissible grounds for rejection where
there are available “a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions” to a problem.109 Under KSR, the Board held,
because the protein was already known in some form and
there existed some method to isolate the corresponding gene,
the isolated sequence was “the product not of innovation but of
ordinary skill and common sense.”110
In this first post-KSR ruling on obviousness in genetic
innovation, the Board cited In re Deuel as being of questionable
validity after KSR, and called for the Federal Circuit to overrule
its precedent.111 The Board emphasized its stance in Ex parte
Kubin by giving it the rare designation precedential.112
The Federal Circuit affirmed rejection of the Kubin claims
on obviousness grounds and endorsed the Board’s reasoning
on the whole.113 The court held that the inventors’ reliance on
105. Id. at 1414.
106. Id. at 1414–15.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1413.
109. Id. at 1414 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
421 (2007)).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Ex parte Kubin is one of only three BPAI decisions to receive the
designation in 2007. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, BPAI Precedential
Opinions, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/prec.htm (last
visited Mar. 11, 2009).
113. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *10 (Fed. Cir.
Apr. 3, 2009). The court did not reach the merits of the § 112, ¶ 1
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conventional methodology for isolating the NAIL coding
sequence, together with a reasonable expectation of success,
rendered the claimed product obvious.114 For the court, this
was a two-step analysis.
First, the court affirmed the Board’s findings that the
Kubin methods were essentially the same as those in the prior
art, and that the prior art references gave the claimants a
reasonable expectation of success.115 At least, it would seem
that is what the court intended to say. The argument is
actually framed in the negative—the double negative. In the
words of the court,
[o]f note, the record nowhere suggests that the [prior art
methods], even if slightly different than the technique disclosed in
the claimed invention, would not yield the same polynucleotide
claimed in [Kubin]. Stated directly, the record shows repeatedly
that Valiante’s [method] produces for any person of ordinary skill
in this art the claimed polynucleotide.116

This unfortunate construction renders the argument
logically precarious, but the court’s position is nonetheless
clear: the Kubin methods are conventional methods wellknown in the prior art. The court found especially damning the
claimants’ own admission that they had used “standard
biochemical methods,”117 stating categorically that the
claimants, “cannot represent to the public that their claimed
gene sequence can be derived and isolated by ‘standard
biochemical methods’ discussed in a well-known manual on
cloning techniques, while at the same time discounting the
relevance of that very manual to the obviousness of their
claims.”118
Like the Board, the court was selective in its application of
the Mathew reference.119 Recall that Mathew described the
rejection. Id. Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying factual
determinations. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17
(1966). The court reviews the Board’s factual determinations under the
substantial evidence standard and its obviousness determinations
without deference. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *4.
114. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *10.
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
117. Id. (quoting U.S. Patent Application No. 09/667, 859 (filed Sept.
20, 2000)).
118. Id.
119. See supra, note 97.
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cloning of the murine 2B4 gene, unknown at the time to be a
NAIL homologue, and reported incorrectly that there is no
human homologue of the gene.120 The court held that while
Mathew was valid for its demonstration of the “relative ease of
deriving the claimed sequence from the prior art,” it was
nonetheless insignificant that the reference taught away from
the Kubin invention.121 Rather, the court held that
Mathew’s quasi-agnostic stance toward the existence of a human
homologue of the 2B4 gene cannot fairly be seen as dissuading
one of ordinary skill in the art from combining Mathew’s
teachings with those of Valiante. Rather, Mathew’s disclosure, in
light of Valiante’s teachings regarding the p38 protein and its role
in NK cell activation, would have aroused a skilled artisan’s
curiosity to isolate the gene coding for p38.122

Thus, the court held that there was sufficient evidence in
the record to support a finding that the Kubin methods were
conventional and well-known in the prior art, and that there
was no significant disincentive for the inventors to pursue
human NAIL isolation.
The second step in the court’s analysis, the heart of the
opinion, addressed the status of In re Deuel after KSR.123 The
court began by discussing the aspects of Deuel relevant to this
case, of which there are three. First, the holding that an amino
acid sequence does not render the corresponding DNA
sequence obvious per se.124 Second, that the method of DNA
isolation is not relevant to nonobviousness of the sequence
itself,125 even where the prior art includes a partial amino acid
sequence.126 Third, that “obvious to try” is not an appropriate
standard for obviousness determination, even where there is a
120. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1414 (B.P.A.I. 2007).
121. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *5.
122. Id. at *6.
123. See id. at *6–9.
124. Id. at *6 (“[K]nowledge of a protein does not give one a conception
of a particular DNA encoding it.”) (quoting In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559
(Fed. Cir. 1995)).
125. Id. at *7 (“[T]he existence of a general method of isolating cDNA or
DNA molecules is essentially irrelevant to the question whether the
specific molecules themselves would have been obvious, in the absence of
other prior art that suggests the claimed DNAs. . . .”) (quoting In re Deuel,
51 F.3d at 1559).
126. Id. at *6 (“In Deuel, this court reversed the Board’s conclusion that
a prior art reference teaching a method of gene cloning, together with a
reference disclosing a partial amino acid sequence of a protein, rendered
DNA molecules encoding the protein obvious.”) (citing In re Deuel, 51 F.3d
at 1559).
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general incentive to undertake the work and general methods
by which to proceed are known in the prior art.127 Under
Deuel, the Kubin claims are undoubtedly permissible. The
outcome of Kubin thus turns on whether Deuel was overruled
by KSR, as the Board had held.128
The Federal Circuit was emphatic in its position that some
aspects of Deuel are no longer good law.129 The court cites KSR
as having “unambiguously discredited” the implication of Deuel
that “the obviousness inquiry cannot consider that the
combination of the claim’s constituent elements was ‘obvious
to try.’”130 The court pointed to the Supreme Court’s criticism
of the Federal Circuit’s failure in Teleflex to consider whether a
particular combination would have been obvious to try,131 and
recited the language of KSR establishing that, “the fact that a
combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious
under § 103.”132
In perhaps a point of irony, the Federal Circuit explained
that in striking down the standard of Deuel, the Supreme
Court reinvigorated the standard of In re O’Farrell, a Federal
Circuit decision issued seven years before Deuel.133 The court
reiterated the view of O’Farrell that “obvious to try” is a
guideline often misunderstood,134 and explained that while it is
true that “obvious to try” is formally not the standard of § 103,
an invention that is obvious under § 103 also would have been
obvious to try.135 Thus, the critical question is “when is an
invention that was obvious to try nevertheless nonobvious?”136
The court identified two situations in which “obvious to

127. Id. at *7 (“‘Obvious to try’ has long been held not to constitute
obviousness. A general incentive does not make obvious a particular
result, nor does the existence of techniques by which those efforts can be
carried out.”) (quoting In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1559).
128. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1414 (B.P.A.I. 2007).
129. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *7–8.
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing to Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 289
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
132. Id. at *8 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421
(2007)).
133. Id. (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903).
136. Id. (quoting In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903).
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try” does not equate to obviousness under § 103.137 First,
where “what would have been ‘obvious to try’ would have been
to vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible
choices until one possibly arrived at a successful result,” but
where there is no guidance from the prior art as to which
combinations would be successful.138 In other words, a court
should not find obviousness where the inventor “merely throws
metaphorical darts at a board filled with combinatorial prior
art possibilities.”139 The court drew support for this in KSR’s
“finite number of identified, predictable solutions” standard,
which it held to be the inverse of the O’Farrell exception.140
The second exception is one in which an inventor explores
a new technology or approach to innovation with only general
guidance from the prior art.141 The court found support for
this in KSR’s statement that § 103 bars patent protection
unless “the improvement is more than the predictable use of
prior art elements according to their established functions.”142
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit found that neither of these
conditions applied to the Kubin invention. The court held that
because the prior art disclosed the protein of interest to the
appellants, an antibody specific to the protein, and a general
method for isolating the protein, the invention was obvious.143
Moreover, the court endorsed the Board’s notion that there
was in the biotechnology industry a general motivation to
pursue the isolation of human NAIL, given the prior art
teaching that p38 is “expressed on virtually all human NK cells
and thus plays a role in the immune response.”144 The court
declined to “cabin KSR to the ‘predictable arts’ (as opposed to
the ‘unpredictable art’ of biotechnology),”145 holding that given
the advanced level of skill in the art, the claimants had “every
motivation to seek and every reasonable expectation of success

137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903).
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421
(2007)).
141. Id. (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903).
142. Id. (quoting KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 417).
143. Id. at *9.
144. Id. (quoting Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1413
(B.P.A.I. 2007).
145. Id. (parentheses in original).
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in achieving the sequence of the claimed invention.”146
In sum, In re Kubin overrules two of the three central
elements of Deuel. The court did not hold that a DNA sequence
is obvious per se where the protein is known in the prior art.
However, it did hold that reliance on conventional methods
may preclude patent protection where there is reasonable
expectation of success, and that “obvious to try” is a valid
consideration even for the unpredictable arts.

II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY:
OBVIOUSNESS IN THE POST-GENOMIC ERA
A. LOST IN TRANSLATION: KSR IS GOOD FOR SOME, BUT NOT ALL
The Federal Circuit’s ruling in Kubin is questionable on
several levels,147 and the case serves as a platform for a
discussion of the general inadequacies of KSR. To start, it is
unclear to what extent the holding of KSR translates to
biotechnology, or any non-mechanical art for that matter. Of
course, the Supreme Court did not expressly limit the holding
of KSR to any particular art. However, all but one of the cases
146. Id. at *10.
147. Within days of the decision, a flurry of commentary by
biotechnology patent practitioners sharply criticized several aspects of the
ruling. See, e.g., Kevin Noonan, In re Kubin, PATENT DOCS BIOTECH. &
PATENT
LAW
&
NEWS
BLOG,
Apr.
6,
2009,
PHARMA.
http://www.patentdocs.org/articles_cases_obviousness/ (criticizing the
Federal Circuit’s mishandling of the scientific elements of In re Kubin);
Donna Young, Federal Circuit’s Patent Ruling Could Broadly Affect Biotech,
BioWorld
Today,
Apr.
8,
2009,
http://www.bioworld.com/servlet/com.accumedia.web.Dispatcher?next=
bioWorldHeadlines_article&forceid=50547 (reporting the views of patent
practitioners as to the likely negative impact of In re Kubin); Patenly
BIOtech,
The
Blunders
of
In
re
Kubin,
Apr.
8,
2009,
http://patentlybiotech.wordpress.com/2009/04/08/the-blunders-of-inre-kubin/ (criticizing generally the logic and scope of In re Kubin). But see
Christopher Holman, In re Kubin: Federal Circuit Clarifies Obviousness
Standard in Context of cDNA Cloning Invention, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH. IP
BLOG,
Apr.
6,
2009,
http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2009/04/in-re-kubin-federalcircuit-clarifies.html (arguing that the implications of In re Kubin for the
biotechnology industry are not severe because of the unusual facts of the
case); David Schwartz, Fed Circuit Ruling Extends KSR Logic to
TECH
TRANSFER
BLOG,
Apr.
15,
2009,
Biotechnology,
THE
http://www.technologytransfertactics.com/content/2009/04/15/fedcircuit-ruling-extends-ksr-logic-to-biotechnology/ (presenting a summary
of opposing views as to the potential impact of In re Kubin).
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the Court drew from involved the validity of mechanical
patents.
The Court relied principally on three of its precedents to
refashion the standard for obviousness determination. United
States v. Adams, a companion case to Graham, addressed the
patentability of a non-rechargeable electrical battery.148 The
Court cited to Adams for the proposition that when a patent
claims a new combination of elements already known in the
prior art, “the combination must do more than yield a
predictable result.”149 Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement
Salvage Co. involved an improved road-paving machine.150 The
Court cited to Anderson’s for the proposition that to be
nonobvious, combination devices must accomplish more than
the individual components would do when operated
sequentially.151 Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc. involved a water flush
system for the removal of animal debris from the floor of a
dairy barn.152 The Court cited to Sakraida for the proposition
that a mere rearrangement of prior art elements that gives only
predictable results is obvious and unpatentable.153 In all three
of these cases, the inventions at issue were not only
mechanical in nature, they were combination devices, as was
the patent at issue in KSR. Precisely how this paradigm
translates to novel biological molecules, such as in Kubin, is
not at all clear.
The only non-mechanical case cited directly in KSR is In re

148. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 40 (1966).
149. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (“The
Court recognized that when a patent claims a structure already known in
the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for
another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a
predictable result.”) (citing Adams, 383 U.S. at 50–51).
150. Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S.
57, 58 (1969).
151. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 417 (“The device, the Court concluded, did
not create some new synergy: The radiant-heat burner functioned just as
a burner was expected to function; and the paving machine did the same.
The two in combination did no more than they would in separate,
sequential operation.”) (citing Anderson’s, 396 U.S. at 60–62).
152. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281–82 (1976).
153. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 417 (“[T]he Court derived from the
precedents the conclusion that when a patent ‘simply arranges old
elements with each performing the same function it had been known to
perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an
arrangement, the combination is obvious.”) (quoting Sakraida, 425 U.S. at
282).
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Deuel.154 The Court’s pronouncement that a finding of
obviousness is appropriate where there exists “a finite number
of identified, predictable solutions”155 is centered on rejection
of the Deuel holding that “‘[o]bvious to try’ has long been held
not to constitute obviousness.”156 In Ex parte Kubin, the Board
focused on this language and on the opportunity to treat Deuel
as no longer valid.157 In doing so, however, the Board handily
re-crafted the language of KSR to fit the facts of Kubin.
In KSR, the Court stated that, “[w]hen there is a design
need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a
finite number of identified, predictable solutions . . . . the fact
that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was
obvious under § 103.”158 However, the Board’s version of this
holding reads, “[w]hen there is motivation to solve a problem
and there are a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions . . . .”159 Under KSR, large-scale market forces such
as industry or consumer demands for the correction of design
flaws may serve as a predicate for a finding of obviousness.160
Under the Board’s view, it would seem that any motivation to
solve a problem equates to these large-scale forces. As the
Board explained in Kubin, “[t]he ‘problem’ facing those in the
art was to isolate NAIL cDNA, and there were a limited number
of methodologies available to do so.”161 The Board refers to

154. A second biotechnology case, Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464
F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2006), was cited in recognition that the Federal
Circuit had broadened its application of the TSM test even before the
writing of KSR, id. at 421–22, but did not contribute substantively to the
holding of the Court.
155. Id. See also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
156. Id. at 414 (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l. Co., 119 F. App’x
282, 289 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 398 (quoting In re Deuel, 51
F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (alteration in original).
157. At least one USPTO official has acknowledged the agency’s
dissatisfaction with the holding of Deuel, stating that USPTO examiners
were “startled that the [Federal Circuit] would have said this was not
obvious.” Eli Kintisch, Patent Experts Hope High Court will Clarify What’s
Obvious, 314 SCIENCE 1230–31 (2006) (quoting Esther Kepplinger, a
supervisor of the biotechnology examiner corps at the time the Deuel
application was filed).
158. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added).
159. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1415 (B.P.A.I. 2007)
(emphasis added).
160. See KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 417.
161. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
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NAIL isolation as facing those in the art, but in fact it was the
problem facing these artisans. The Board attributed the
individual motivation of these claimants to the whole of the
biotechnology industry in order to find a market pressure and
suggest the researchers were essentially passive in deciding
whether and how to pursue NAIL isolation. It is more than a
little disturbing that the Federal Circuit endorsed this
reasoning.162 This broad interpretation of KSR is literally
without bounds, as presumably all work is undertaken with
some kind of motivation.
The distortion of this aspect of KSR speaks to the
vagueness of the holding. What is a market pressure? What is
a design need? How large a segment of the market must have
the need? How must the need be expressed? In KSR, need and
pressure took the form of a contract for services by a dominant
American auto manufacturer,163 an easy example. How this
translates to other industries is impossible to say without more
concrete definitions of these fundamental concepts. Does the
fact that many people die each year from cancer create a
market pressure to discover new treatments? Under a strict
reading of Kubin, the answer may be yes.
The Federal Circuit’s view that the use of known
methodologies renders the NAIL cDNA obvious is equally
misguided. KSR refers to the use of known methodologies only
in the context of improvements to mechanical devices, stating:
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary
skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its
patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to
improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way,
using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is
beyond his or her skill.164

The Court cites to Anderson’s and Sakraida as illustrative
of this holding,165 which, as described above, related to
mechanical combination devices.166 In both cases, the
technique for improvement was the joining of prior art
162.
Apr. 3,
163.
164.
165.
166.

In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *9–10 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 409–10.
Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
Id.
See supra, notes 150–153 and accompanying text.
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elements that previously existed only separately. The
Anderson’s patent combined on one chassis a radiant heat
burner, a pavement spreader, and a leveling device.167 The
Sakraida patent combined prior art water storage tanks,
means for rapid water release, and drains positioned at the low
end of a sloped floor to create a system for flushing debris from
the floor of a barn.168 Likewise, the technique in question in
KSR was to combine known pedal elements that had not been
joined in the prior art.169 None of these scenarios involves the
use of existing methods to derive something new, as in Kubin.
The obvious-by-methodology argument also conflates two
aspects of the KSR holding. The first, described immediately
above, is that the use of known methods to improve known
elements is obvious.170 The second is that obviousness may be
found where there is a finite number of possible solutions.171
The Board split the difference between these statements to find
obviousness where there are “a limited number of
methodologies available,”172 and the Federal Circuit endorsed
this position without comment. There is an important
difference between these views, however. The claims at issue in
KSR address a design need in the automotive industry where
the solution (of which there are a finite number) is the claimed
device. By contrast, in Kubin, the method (of which there are a
limited number) is the means to obtain the claimed device.
Under Kubin, the pedal assembly in KSR would be held
obvious not because of the design itself, but because there are
a limited number of ways to cast the metal used to make the
device. This approach runs contrary to the language of § 103,
which states that “[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made.”173 Recall that this
language was included to quash the flash of genius standard
announced by the Supreme Court in Cuno.174 The very essence
167. Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S.
57, 58 (1969).
168. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281–82 (1976).
169. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 406.
170. Id. at 417; see also supra note 164 and accompanying text.
171. See id. at 421; see also supra note 50, 56, and accompanying text.
172. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1414 (B.P.A.I. 2007)
(emphasis added).
173. United States Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
174. See supra note 25.
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of this provision is that the focus of an obviousness inquiry
should be the product of the inventive effort, not the means
employed by the inventor. The Federal Circuit would have
inventors disavow proven technologies in favor of re-inventing
the wheel, so to speak, in order to withstand an obviousness
determination. Not only would this be inefficient and socially
wasteful, it may not always be possible to devise novel
methods, especially in highly technical fields. In In re Kubin,
the court made a point of the fact that the claimants cited to
the “very same cloning manual” as the Valiante reference.175
What the court failed to appreciate is that both cited to
Sambrook/Maniatis because it was the only manual of any
repute, to which any molecular biologist can attest.
The reasoning of In re Kubin illustrates the shortcomings
of KSR, which is both too narrowly tailored to translate easily
to other disciplines and sufficiently vague on key elements to
yield little guidance as to their meaning. On the whole, KSR is
unsatisfying as the Supreme Court’s first declaration on the
issue in over forty years. A common sense approach is
inadequate to address this difficult question of law when
applied to biological science. Nonetheless, together KSR and
Kubin raise interesting and difficult questions regarding
nonobviousness standards in biotechnology as it exists today.
Standards implemented by the Federal Circuit in the
industry’s infancy are coming under increased scrutiny and
have perhaps been outgrown by advances in the art.

B. LIFE ON PLANET EARTH: THE REALITIES OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
Some scholars have criticized In re Bell and In re Deuel as
overindulgent to the biotechnology industry, arguing that
knowledge of a protein sequence is sufficient to render the
corresponding gene sequence obvious to a person of skill in the
art.176 However, this criticism fails to consider the relevant
175. In re Kubin, No. 2008-1184, 2009 WL 877646 at *9 (Fed. Cir. Apr.
3, 2009) (emphasis in original).
176. See, e.g., Harold C. Wegner, Chemical and Biotechnology
Obviousness in a State of Flux, 26 BIOTECH. L. REP. 437, 459–60 (2007)
(criticizing the Federal Circuit’s approach to biotechnology obviousness
and calling for “death to the holding in Deuel.”); Harold C. Wegner, Deuel
Death to “Motivation”: Whither KSR and Kahn 9 (Apr. 21, 2006),
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/3349/KS
RDeuelDeath.pdf (criticizing the holdings of Bell and Deuel; referring to
the holding of Deuel as a “deviant standard for biotechnology”). But see
Andrew V. Trask, Note, “Obvious to Try”: A Proper Patentability Standard
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facts on which an obviousness determination is based for
genetic innovation—the biological facts.
It is indisputable that DNA and proteins are fundamentally
related, and that their interrelatedness is largely stable and
reproducible.177 Were this not true, genetic engineering as it
exists today would not be possible. However, as illustrated in
Fig. 2, a one-to-one codon-to-amino acid correlation simply
does not exist. Some amino acids are specified by as many as
six different codons.178 From an evolutionary standpoint,
degeneracy of the genetic code is a good thing, because it
allows for small mistakes in codon sequence to occur without
altering the corresponding protein sequence, which could have
a devastating result for the viability of a cell.179 From a
molecular biologist’s standpoint, however, degeneracy is a
barrier to predicting gene sequence based solely on protein
sequence. For even the smallest of proteins, there are simply
too many possible coding sequences to make feasible a trial
and error approach.180 This is precisely why geneticists have
developed various other means to clone genes. It is also the
reason the Federal Circuit was quick to re-tool KSR’s “finite
number of identified, predictable solutions” standard to one
that encompasses an “easily traversed, small and finite
number of alternatives.”181 True, it is possible to tabulate all
the possible gene sequences, one of which is correct. However,
it is not possible to predict which is correct based solely on
protein sequence. Regardless of the legal implications of Deuel,
the Federal Circuit got the science right.
From an industry standpoint, the holding of Deuel was
important because it respected the historical progression of life
science research. Scientists had begun to characterize proteins
in the Pharmaceutical Arts?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2625, 2632–36 (2008)
(arguing that unpredictability is simply a reality of the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical arts and that “obvious to try” is not an appropriate
standard for those industries; arguing that KSR does not permit courts to
deny patents in these arts on the basis that the innovation was obvious to
try).
177. See generally GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 60.
178. Id.
179. For example, note the similarity of the codons that specify leucine
(leu) shown in Fig. 2. They are: AAT, AAC, GAC, GAT, GAG, GAA, Reading
the codons in sequence, only a single base differs one to the next.
180. See supra notes 62 and 63 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
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in great detail182 long before it was known that DNA is the
genetic material,183 much less how it is that DNA encodes
protein products. Until relatively recently, it was the norm for
proteins to be characterized in some form and at least partially
sequenced before the corresponding gene was cloned, just as a
practical matter.184 If protein sequences were held to render
gene sequences obvious, entire fields of genetic research would
have been precluded from patent protection by protein
chemistry done years (or decades) before recombinant DNA
technology even existed.
Nevertheless, one aspect of the Bell–Deuel standard may
be vulnerable. While the Bell court held that protein sequences
do not render gene sequences obvious, it explicitly reserved
judgment on whether the converse is also true—whether DNA
sequences render proteins obvious.185 At the time, prior to the
release of the first completed genomes,186 so-called forward
182. E.g., Linus Pauling et al., The Structure of Proteins: Two Hydrogenbonded Helical Configurations of the Polypeptide Chain, 37 PROC. NAT’L.
ACAD. SCI. 205 (1951); Linus Pauling & Carl Niemann, The Structure of
Proteins, 61 J. AM. CHEMICAL SOC’Y 1860 (1939); Alfred E. Mirsky & Linus
Pauling, On the Structure of Native, Denatured, and Coagulated Proteins,
22 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 439 (1936).
183. Alfred D. Hershey & Martha Chase, Independent Functions of Viral
Protein and Nucleic Acid in Growth of Bacteriophage, 36 J. GEN.
PHYSIOLOGY 39 (1952).
184. Consider the history of the characterization of insulin, for
example. The protein was physically isolated from cellular extracts in
1921, the amino acid sequence was determined in 1953, and the human
gene was sequenced in 1980. Quite literally, the techniques used to
sequence the amino acid were not in existence at the time the protein was
first identified. Moreover, when the protein was sequenced in 1953, it was
not yet widely accepted that DNA is the genetic material. Graeme I. Bell et
al., Sequence of the Human Insulin Gene, 284 NATURE 26 (1980); Frederick
Sanger & E.O.P. Thompson, The Amino-acid Sequence in the Glycyl Chain
of Insulin: 1. The Identification of Lower Peptides from Partial Hydrolysates,
53 BIOCHEMICAL J. 353 (1953); Frederick Sanger & E.O.P. Thompson, The
Amino-acid Sequence in the Glycyl Chain of Insulin: 2. The Investigation of
Peptides from Enzymic Hydrolysates, 53 BIOCHEMICAL J. 366 (1953);
Fredrick G. Banting, Nobel Lecture Delivered at Stockholm on September
15th, 1925: Diabetes and Insulin (Sept. 15, 1925).
185. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also supra
note 74 and accompanying text.
186. The first complete genome sequenced was that of Haemophilus
influenzae, released in 1995. Robert D. Fleischmann et al., Whole-Genome
Random Sequencing and Assembly of Haemophilus influenzae Rd, 269
SCIENCE 496 (1995). The first eukaryotic genome to be completed was
Saccharomyces cerevisiae (yeast), released in 1996. André Goffeau et al.,
Life With 6000 Genes, 274 SCIENCE 546 (1996). The first multicellular
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reading of genetic information—DNA to protein—was
uncommon. The court could afford to reserve judgment then,
but perhaps no longer. Genomic data (partial or complete) are
publicly available for hundreds of species, with more on the
way.187 The information is of course invaluable to genetic
researchers, but it may be the elephant in the room from the
standpoint of patentability of proteins. The reason is that, as
illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2, forward reading of genomic
sequence is straightforward.188 Quite literally, anyone with a
table of the genetic code could translate coding sequence to
protein sequence.189 It is precisely because DNA, RNA, and
proteins have discernable relationships that biotechnology
research has progressed as far as it has. This is a central
element of modern medicine and is the basis for breakthrough
therapies such as recombinant human insulin (an old
example) and gene replacement therapy (a new example).190
On one hand, it is inconsistent to invoke the realities of
biology to argue that reverse reading is not obvious, and then
avoid the converse reality because it is inconvenient. On the
other hand, to hold that forward reading is obvious would
radically alter the landscape of biotechnology patenting. Whole
classes of biological molecules—mRNAs and proteins—would
be removed from the patent arena overnight, and scores of
issued patents would be brought into crisis. The public stores
of knowledge would also be negatively affected as industry
players resort to trade secret practice to protect new
developments. Industry analysts also argue that the subjective
obviousness analysis of KSR will stem the flow of money into

eukaryotic genome completed was that of Caenorhabditis elegans,
released in 1998. C. elegans Sequencing Consortium, Genome Sequence of
the Nematode C. elegans: A Platform for Investigating Biology, 282 SCIENCE
2012 (1998).
187. Genbank is an annotated collection of all publicly available DNA
sequences maintained by the National Institutes of Health. It is available
for searching at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Genbank/. See Dennis A .
Benson, et al., GenBank, 36 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. D25 (2008).
188. See supra pp. 810–12.
189. Of course, there are aspects of genomic interpretation that are not
so straightforward, such as alternative transcriptional start sites and
alternative splicing. For simplicity, these are not considered here.
190. See Gary Walsh, Biopharmaceutical Benchmarks, 18 NATURE
BIOTECH. 831 (2000).
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C. INDUSTRY-TOLERANT OBVIOUSNESS STANDARDS
One thing made clear by KSR and Kubin is that generic
obviousness standards do not translate well to biotechnology.
It is implausible to equate biological science with the
automotive industry, as artisans in these fields face radically
different challenges. An obvious solution would be to address
the needs of specific industries directly and separately from
those of other industries. As some scholars point out, when
the uniform patent system was adopted, inventive efforts in
this country were predominantly mechanical in nature, and
were far more homogeneous than today.192 With the emergence
of new technologies such as biotechnology, computer hardware
and software, electronics, and semiconductors, uniform rules
are no longer appropriate or adequate.193
Some proponents of industry-tolerant patentability
standards argue that courts already enforce differential
standards across industries.194 Burk and Lemley argue that
the Federal Circuit has responded to the needs of new
technologies by applying the uniform rules in a manner that
effectively creates industry-specific standards.195 Through
close case analysis the authors demonstrate, for example, that
the Federal Circuit enforces a much stricter written description
requirement196 in biotechnology than in other industries,197
191. Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents 5–10, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398
(2007) (No. 04-1350).
192. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the
United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 134–38 (2002).
193. Id. at 142–44.
194. See generally Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the
Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127 (2008); Dan L. Burk,
Biotechnology in the Federal Circuit: A Clockwork Lemon, 46 ARIZ. L. REV.
441 (2004); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law TechnologySpecific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002).
195. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 194 at 1183.
196. United States Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006).
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it,
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
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while permitting a lowered standard for nonobviousness.198
Conversely, the computer software industry enjoys minimal
enablement and best mode requirements,199 and a more
stringent nonobviousness standard.200
Opponents argue that industry-tolerant standards will be
administratively burdensome,201 and prone to erosion.202
However, it is not clear why an explicit standard would be any
more prone to erosion than the ad hoc judicial approach
currently in place. If anything, an unambiguous standard
should be more resistant than the stop-gap measures of the
Federal Circuit. Regarding the administrative burden, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) already
operates
an
industry-specific
examiner
corps.203
Implementation of industry-tolerant standards could be as
straightforward as revising examination guidelines to reflect
the new practice. The real burden would be in conducting an
initial study of the issue and drafting recommended guidelines.
However, there is likely no shortage of biotechnology industry
advocates willing to contribute to the process. Critics of the
USPTO may argue that the agency struggles to enforce
statutory requirements as it is, and that introducing nonuniform standards would only complicate matters further. If
anything, however, that argument speaks to the need to reform
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention. Id.
197. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 194, at 1183 & n.120.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1162–63 (citing N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908
F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
200. Id. at 1167–68 (citing Amazon.com v. Barnes & Noble, 239 F.3d
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, 107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
201. Mark D. Janis, Equilibrium in a Technology-Specific Patent System,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 743, 744 (2004) (“One threshold question is
whether we will even be able to talk about a unitary patent law
jurisprudence if [such] proposals are implemented. Might we instead find
ourselves confronted with fifty-seven patent law jurisprudences, each
specifically tailored to particular technologies?”).
202. Id. (“Perhaps the [proposals] should give greater attention to
elucidating controls that would guard against the dissolution of [industryspecific standards] and thereby maintain some level of systematic
coherence.”).
203. See, e.g., U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Patent Examiner Positions,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/exam.htm (last visited Mar. 16,
2009).
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standards. If Bell, Deuel, and Kubin are any indication, it
would seem that the problem lies not in the relative complexity
of the standard, but in the fact that examiners are required to
apply uniform standards to vastly different technologies, and
the fit is often poor. The reality is that legal standards for
obviousness are rooted in the practical considerations of
invention. Practically speaking, it seems obvious that wet
batteries, pavement spreaders, and manure flushers—
combination mechanical devices—should be viewed through a
slightly different lens than novel biological molecules designed
to improve our collective health and well-being.

III. CONCLUSION
Biotechnology in the post-genomic era is an exceedingly
advanced industry, and is growing more so every year. Genetic
innovation is a central component of modern medicine and it is
in the public interest to foster industry advances wherever
possible. Adequate patent protection is an important counterbalance to the enormous risk and expense of biotechnological
undertakings, but current obviousness standards are poised to
fail the industry.
The Supreme Court’s reformulation of obviousness
determination in KSR is inadequate to address the needs of
varied modern industries, the highly technical arts in
particular. While the Court purported to set forth a generic
standard, broadly applicable to the patentable arts, it crafted a
standard that is too narrow and too vague to be of use
generally. A strict reading of KSR would revoke patent
protection for innovations that are standard in the
biotechnology industry, as illustrated by the Board’s
mechanical application of KSR in Ex parte Kubin.
Obviousness standards that tolerate the realities of
biotechnology research are necessary to foster continued
investment in the industry and the dissemination of research
data to the public. Standards that parallel the Federal Circuit’s
pre-KSR biotechnology jurisprudence would promote the
public interest in advancing high-level research while
maintaining reasonable standards for patentability.

